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PHILIPPINE MACROECONOMIC POLICIF_S
AFFECTING HOUSEHOLDS
Benjamin E. Diokno
I. INTRODUCTION
The Philippine economic performance in the 1980s is typical of highly indebted countries
(HICs) which were caught in a bind as a result of prolonged recession in developed countries
in the 1980s and the rise in real interest rates. The ability of the Philippines to increase exports
was severely limited by the world economic slowdown and the tall in primary commodity prices.
At the same time, its debt burden rose dramatically as real interest rates rose and funds from
commercial banks dried up.
Under such difficult circumstances, the Philippine government embarked on a series of
stabilization and structural adjustment programs. This study discusses the key macroeconomic
policies adopted in recent years and how they may affect individual households. This discussion
is given in Section Ii. The mechanisms by which monetary and fiscal adjustments affect the labor
market, the goods market and government expenditures including the provision of public goods
are broadly discussed in Section III. In the final section, some areas for future research are
discussed.
II. MACROECONOMIC POLICIES
A. Description of the Imbalance
Analysis of the economic crisis and the Philippine experience in macroeconomic
adjustment are contained in a number of studies (de Dios et al. 1984 and Montes 1987) and need
not be repeated here. While reforms have been undertaken, they seem to be ineffective or
inadequate, or both.
A cause for worry is a recent study on the Philippine economy which concludes that
given the current economic structure and incentives, the Philippine economy's potential growth
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2remains low, perhaps as low as three percent (Krugman 1992). The study says that the fairly
rapid pace of economic growth from 1986 to 1989 was heavily dependent on rapid growth of
imports without corresponding rapid export growth, and that it cannot be replicated on a
sustained basis unless some structural changes are undertaken.
The economic crisis in the early 1980s had enormous social costs. And based on more
recent studies, it would seem that the macroeconomic adjustments undertaken appear to have had
limited effect on the alleviation of poverty. The Philippines has the unenviable position of being
one of the few countries only country in Southeast Asia where the absolute number of the poor
has actually been increasing. In 1988, there were 5.8 million poor families, about 55 percent of
the population. This number is only a slight improvement over the 58 percent proportion of poor
families registered in 1985 (Balisacan 1991). And whilc no hard statistics exist for 1991, the
general perception is that the number of poor may have actually increased owing to massive
unemployment resulting from the economic slowdown and energy crisis during the years 1991
and 1992.
B. Recent Adjustment Program
An adjustment program is supposed to eliminate serious imbalances or disequilibria in
an economy. It may take the form of a short-run stabilization program aimed at minimizing
distortions from a specific equilibrium path. It may also take the form of a long-run adjustment
program aimed at shifting the equilibrium path itself. The disequilibria are of two kinds:
"an external imbalance that is an unsustainable deficit or surplus in the balance
of payments in a fixed exchange rate regime; and an internal imbalance that is a
discrepancy between aggregate expenditure or absorption, and output or income,
at full employment of resources (including labor). In the context of structural
adjustment the balance, or equilibrium, will relate to both the above aggregate
balances and shifts in some sectoral balances as well. The source of
disequilibrium could be either exogenous, such as an unanticipated permanent
shock to an exogenous factor that affects the economy, such as the terms of trade
in a small open economy. It could also be the policy stance of the government,
such as an unsustainable policy induced public sector deficit." (T.N. Srinivasan
1988: 2).
The 1987-1992 adjustment program adopted by the government to obtain a three-year
extended arrangement with the international Monetary Fund (IMF) is based on the Medium-
Term Development Plan, 1987-1992. The program aims to achieve growth, alleviate poverty,
attain price stability, and sustain external payments position.
The program has been summarized and analyzed in a number of studies (Lamberte et al.
1991 and Krugman et al. 1992). Some general comments have to be made at this point.
3First, the Philippines failed to meet the major objectives of the program because of some
external shocks and inappropriate government policy. The external shocks include the series of
coup attempts (the most serious of which was the December 1989 incident), the drought and the
consequent power outages, the July 1990 killer quake, the Gulf War, and the Mt. Pinatubo
eruptions. On the other hand, there were internal policy shortcomings such as the conservative
external debt strategy and myopic exchange rate management strategy. In addition, there were
slippages in the fiscal and monetary areas.
Second, while there have been several structural programs in the 1980s calling for tariff
reforms, rationalization of indirect taxes, restructuring of the industrial incentive system, and
adjustment in energy prices, much remains to be done. Of course, there were progress in some
areas such as tax reform, trade liberalization and dismantling of monopolies in the agricultural
sector. But much remains to be done in the following areas: privatization, deregulation and
rationalization of the energy sector, removal of the remaining quantitative restrictions in trade
and their replacements with tariffs where warranted, financial sector reforms including a
program to rehabilitate and restructure the Central Bank, and liberalization of the foreign
exchange market.
Third, from 1990 to 1992, the Philippine government has been preoccupied with demand
management policies. The decision of the government tO stick to the program despite external
shocks to the economy as mentioned above has been criticized in a number of studies (Diokno
1990 and 1992). Worse, cutting public spending for essential public services including physical
infrastructure to match shortfalls in revenues, has contributed to the immediate slowdown of the
economy; it also shifted the Philippine economy to a lower growth path in the medium term.
Fourth, both short-term stabilization programs and long-term structural adjustment
programs in the 1980s have been preoccupied with their impact on macroeconomic aggregates.
Of late, however, the World Bank (WB) and the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) have shown some concern about the impact of adjustment on income distribution and
poverty.
C. Review of Economic Performance
After contracting by an average of 7.9 percent annually in 1984 and 1985, the economy
registered an average annual growth of 4.8 percent. From a peak of 7.2 percent growth in 1988,
GNP decelerated to 5.8 percent in 1989. Without a doubt, the change in political leadership and
the economic reforms led to the recovery. It was also aided by an accommodative fiscal and
monetary policy. During the period, significant structural reforms were undertaken to achieve
greater economic efficiency and ensure the long-term sustainability of growth.
Unfortunately, because of some external shocks and delays and lapses in the
implementation of structural reforms, the rapid growth rate became unsustainable. Starting with
the December 1989 coup, the Aquino government had to grapple with a series of crisis: power
shortage, the killer earthquake which claimed 1,500 lives and caused massive property damage,
the Gulf War and finally the Mt. Pinatubo eruptions. All these have wrought much damage to
the economy, but the deceleration of the economy was as much due to the failure to institute the
necessary reforms and policies. (For an excellent analysis, see P. Krugman et al. 1992.)
By the second half of 1990, the economy was on the verge of another foreign exchange
crisis. From 1986 to 1988, current account surplus averaged about 0.3 percent of GNP. The
current account balance dropped rapidly, posting a deficit equivalent to 5.6 percent of GNP of
1990. By the end of 1990, international reserves (excluding gold) were at a precariously low
level of $924 million. The threat of inflation reemerged, jumping to double-digit level in 1989,
after being tamed from 1986 to 1988. Despite this surge in prices, real interest rates continued
to rise steadily. As a result, the budget deficit in 1990 almost doubled compared to its previous
year's level.
With these developments, the economic management strategy shifted from growth to
stabilization. Thus, it is important to recognize that during the period 1990-1991, the adjustment
measures, with fiscal and monetary policies playing a major role, were geared towards
stabilizing the economy.
D. Adjustment Policies
1. Fiscal Restraint
As in any stabilization policy which is concerned with reducing absorption, the objective
of the Aquino medium-term fiscal plan was to progressively reduce the national government
deficit as a percentage of GNP. But to simultaneously address the problems of reducing deficits
and increasing investments, fiscal policy centered on measures aimed at raising revenues and
optimizing the use of scarce budgetary resources (Diokno 1990, 1992).
Adjustments were made on the tax structure, tax administration, and the quality and
distribution of government expenditures. As a result of the 1986 tax reform program and
improvements in tax administration, tax effort increased to 14.4 percent in 1991. Budgetary
assistance to government corporations as a share of total budget has declined dramatically. And
despite the debt servicing requirements, social services expenditures have received priority
attention from the Aquino government (Table 1).
Current expenditures grew rapidly from an average of 8.9 percent of GNP in 1980-1985
to 13.3 percent: in 1986-1989, primarily due to the increase in interest payments and personal
services. Interest payments increased as the national government assumed guaranteed liabilities
of government corporations and financial institutions and mopped up liquidity for the Central
Bank. The interest payments on assumed liabilities increased from ta700 million in 1986 to
t_13.6 billion in 1991.
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SECTORAL ALLOCATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES
AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP, NET OF DEBT SERVICE AND NET LENDING, 1980-1992
(In Percent)
PARTICULARS 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Economic Services 6.___54 7.____7_7 .5.9 5..__9_0 4.___22 3..._66
Agriculture, Agrarian Reform
and Natural Resources 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.0 0.7 0.8
Trade and Industry 0.4 0.9 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.2
Tourism 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Power and Energy 1.1 1.1 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.2
Water Resource Development
and Flood Control 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.3
Communications, Roads and
other Transportation 2.7 2.8 2.3 2.2 1.4 1.5
Other Economic Services 0.6 1.1 0.6 0.8 1.6 0.6
Social Services 3...__3 3._._66 3._._4 3...__! 2..__44 2_.7
Education, Culture and
Manpower Development 2.0 2.2 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.9
Health 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.6
Social Security and Labor Welfare 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Land Distribution (CARP) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Housing and Community Development 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.1
Other Social Services 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Defense 2.___44 2.__44 2.3 2.2 _1.5 1._._88
Domestic Security 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.1 1.3
Peace and Order 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5
General Public Services 1 .___99 2.41 2..._4 2..._1 1.____66 1.9
General Administration 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.1 0.8 1.0
Public Order and Safety 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Other General Public Services 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.7
Net Lending 0..___0 0.__.0 0.0 0._9_0 0.__9.0 0..__9_0
Debt Service 0.__9_0 0.__.0 0.0 0._9_0 0.__9_0 0.__0
Interest Payments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Debt Amortization 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TOTAL 1.3.9 15.____88 14..0 12.4 _9.7 10.l'
GNP (In P million) 243270 280543313544 363268 508485 556074
Source: Department of Budget and Management.
6Table 1 (cont'd.)
P A R T I C U L A R S 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Economic Services 4,'/ 3 .'7 3 .__1 4,_._3 4,__29 4,'/ 4,.22
Agriculture, Agrarian Reform
and Natural Resources 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.4 i .4 1.4 1.3
Trade and Industry 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Tourism 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0
Power and Energy 0.2 0.3 0.0 0,1 0.6 0.1 0.1
Water Resource Development
and Flood Control 0.3 0,2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3
Communications, Roads and
other Transportation 1.3 1,3 1.5 1.9 1.6 1.8 1.6
Other Economic Services 1,9 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.7
Social Services 3.5 4....._1 3 ._)_9 4._ 4.6 5 ,_..! 4,_88
Education, Culture and
Manpower Development 2.5 2.5 2.8 3,0 3.1 3,1 2,9
Health 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0,7 0.7 0.8
Social Security and Labor Welfare 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0,2 0.5 0.4
Land Distribution (CARP) 0.0 0.1 0.0 0_0 0,1 0,2 0,2
Housing and Community Development 0.3 0.1 0_1 0.1 0,1 0.1 0.1
Other Social Services 0.0 0.7 0,2 0.3 0,3 0.6 0,5
Defense 1.29 1 ,._99 2 .__3 9_0 2,1....., 2.._._0.0 1,_.__88
Domestic Security 1,3 1.3 1.6 1_4 1,4 1,3 1.2
Peace and Order 0.7 0.6 0,7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.6
General Public Services 1 ._...88 1 ...99 2,1 1,9 2,..._2 2.....!1 2.__.66
General Administration 0.9 1.0 1.0 1,1 1.2 1.1 1,2
Public Order and Safety 0.2 0.2 0.2 0,3 0.4 0.4 0,3
Other General Public Services 0.6 0,7 0.9 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.3
Net Lending 0......0 O.__Q0 0.0 0,0 0,__0 0......0 0._....0
Debt Service o.__Q0 0,0 0_0.0 0.__.0.0 0..._0.0 0......0 0,..._0_0
Interest Payments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0,0
Debt Amortization 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0
TOTAL 12.___Q0 1.I.5 li.5 12.6 13.8 13._ 2,3'5
GNP (In P million) 596276 673]30 77-'_9 91,1251 1068486 1267600 1440600
Despite efforts to increase the level of investments, implementation delays were
numerous. While public investment as a percent of GNP in 1991 was higher than the 1985 level
of 3.9 percent, it was very much lower than the pre-crisis level of 9.7 percent in 1982.
Furthermore, the 4.9 percent to GNP level is grossly inadequate considering the massive
destruction wrought by the 1990 killer earthquake and the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo eruptions (Table
2).
The budgets in recent years were much tighter than what the nominal numbers suggest.
In the first place, the relative size of the national government deficit had progressively declined
from 1986 to 1989, only to increase again in 1990. But the deficit is expected to taper off again
7in 1991 and 1992 (Table 3). The unanticipated rise in interest payments was the major reason
for the deterioration of the fiscal position in 1990 as actual interest payments exceeded the
planned level by t_15.7 billion. Secondly, if interest payments are netted out, the primary fiscal
balance exhibits surpluses from 1987 to 1991 (Table 4). This indicates how significantly the
interest bill has contributed to deteriorating fiscal finances. Finally, since debt service accounts
for a disproportionately large share of total budget in recent years, government spending adjusted
for debt service and net lending is lower than its pre-crisis peak level (Yap 1990).
Table 2
PUBLIC INVESTMENTS, 1980-1991
(In Billion Pesos)
National Government Percentage
Year Government Corporation I/ LGUs Total of GNP
1980 8.4 11.1 0.5 20.0 8.2
1981 12.7 13:9 0.6 27.2 9.7
1982 9.3 13.3 0.7 23.3 7.4
1983 10.4 18.1 0.8 29.3 8.1
1984 9.8 12.9 0.9 23.6 4.6
1985 8.8 12.3 0.8 21.9 3.9
1986 11.7 5.9 0.6 18.2 3.1
1987 12.9 7.9 1.5 22.3 3.3
1988 15.2 9.0 1.4 25.6 3.2
1989 21.6 15.0 1.8 38.4 4.2
1990 29.1 26.8 2.6 58.5 5.5
1991 37.2 21.1 3.7 62.0 4.9
1/ 1990 figure based on GCMCC financial report as of 23 October 1991 and 1991 figure
based on GCMCC financial report (October actual) dated 25 November 1991.
There has been an overreliance on domestic borrowing as a way of financing the budget
deficit. It accounted for about 71 percent of national government deficit from 1986 to 1991,
thereby putting pressure on domestic interest rates. As a result, investment and growth are
dampened. Furthermore, given the huge domestic public debt, the higher rates result in widening
the budget deficit.
8Table 3
PUBLIC SECTOR DEFICIT, 1985-1991
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Estimate Forecast
National Government 11.1 31.3 16.7 23.2 19.6 37.2 26.6 3.6
Major Corporations 8.1 6.8 3.2 (2.0) 4.4 19.1 15.4 13.7
LGUs and Social Security Institute (0.9) (5.9) (5.3) (5.4) (4.2) (11.6) (8.9) (11.5)
Government Financial Institutions 18.5 12.0 (1.3) (1.8) (3.3) (3.1) (2.0) (3.2)
Central Bank 15.5 18.2 10.9 16.9 20.8 21..9 21.5 36.1
Oil Price Stabilization Fund 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.1 7.4 (11.5) 2.5
Intersectoral Transfers (16.1) (32.7) (8.7) (1.1) (5.3) (13.1) (9.6) (4.2)
Total Public Sector Deficit 36.2 29.7 15.5 29.8 39. I 57.8 31.5 37.0
As a percent of GNP 6.1 4.8 2.2 3.6 4.1 5.4 2.5 2.6
2. Tight Monetary Policy
The Central Bank's obsession to control inflation has led the government to pursue a tight
monetary policy. Growth in money supply was severely restricted in 1991. As a result, interest
rates rose to their highest levels under the Aquino government (F. Medalla 1992). At the same
time the high interest rate policy of the Central Bank is also aimed at protecting the peso by
keeping speculators from converting pesos into dollars.
3. Exchange Rate Policy
Altering the exchange rate is an important policy tool for a country with a trade deficit.
A trade deficit implies that the absorption of traded goods (exports and import-substituting
goods) exceeds their production. Since by definitiou, the production of nontraded goods is
always equal to absorption, an ilnportant implication is that to close the trade deficit
permanently, it is necessary to alter the real exchange rate, specifically to increase the price of
nontraded goods and lower the price of traded goods. It will restore trade balance as a result of
9two effects. Producers will shift their production toward traded goods because their price relative
to the price of goods produced domestically but not traded internationally has increased, in
relative terms. As a result, their incomes will rise. Consumers, on the other hand, will shift to
nontraded goods because, in relative terms, their prices have declined, thus reducing
expenditures. As a result of the nominal devaluation, exports will increase and imports of
foreign goods will fall.
Table 4
BUDGET DEFICIT AND INTEREST PAYMENTS
(In Billion Pesos)
INTEREST PAYMENTS
...............................................
Traditional Regular Assumed Total Primary % Of GNP
Budget Deficit Liabilities Budget Surplus
1985 (11.1) 14.6 0.0 14.6 3.5 06
1986 (131.3) 20.9 0.7 21.6 (9.7) (16)
1987 (16.7) 24.7 12.2 36.9 20.2 29
1988 (23.2) 32.7 13.2 45.9 22.7 28
1989 (19.6) 41.4 13.3 54.7 35.1 37
1990 (37.2) 57.1 14.0 71.1 33.9 32
1991 (26.6) 69.8 13.6 83.4 56.8 45
Sources: Department of Budget and Management
National Economic and Development Authority
Bureau of the Treasury
In the area of exchange rate policy, actions do not match announced intentions. While
the government has outwardly indicated its support for a flexible exchange rate, in reality the
Central Bank has been managing the movements of the exchange rate. It is generally perceived
by economists and financial experts that a high interest policy was pursued by the Central Bank
to defend the exchange rate.
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From 1986-1989, the peso depreciated by only 6.6 percent against the US dollar. The
effective exchange rate depreciated by only 16.7 percent from 1986 to 1988 mainly because of
the adjustments in the currencies of thecountry's major trading partners. It hardly moved in
1989 despite the worsening of the country's trade and current account balance in that year. And
when the peso came under heavy pressure in the foreign exchange market in mid-1990, the
Central Bank attempted to stabilize the peso through exchange market intervention and by
introducing a number of administrative measures (Lamberte et al. 1991: 35-36).
The minor role played by exchange rate adjustment is said to be the weakest aspect of
the stabilization program. F. Medalla (1992: 10) laments that while the current account deficit
is in many ways a more serious problem than the public sector deficit, exchange rate adjustment,
which affects external balance more directly than monetary or fiscal tools, was not given a major
role. A counterfactual analysis may show that the stabilization program may have been less
contractionary if a higher depreciation had been effective in the fourth quarter of 1990. Some
argue that the depreciation of the peso to ia28/US$1 "came in too late and appears to be too
little considering the size of the deficit and the more than 10 percent differential between the
official and black market rates" (Lamberte et al. 1991: 36).
Because of the poor exchange rate policy, trade deficit was reduced not bY exporting
more or importing less but by reducing output growth. Worse, the gains from stabilization were
temporary since the incentive structure remained the same. The fact remains that economic
power will result in import growth that is much taster than both export growth and output
growth.
III. TRANSMISSION MECHANISM
Imbalances in the economy can be corrected through the use of macroeconomic
adjustment policies, generally through fiscal, monetary and foreign exchange policies. In the
Philippines, as argued by F. Medalla (1992), there has been an overreliance on fiscal and
monetary tools to correct the imbalances. Exchange rate adjustment played a very minor role
in the most recent stabilization program in 1990-1991. The purpose of this section is to describe
the transmission mechanism with the use of fiscal and monetary policy.
A. Fiscal Policy
In the early 1980s, the government embarked on an ambitious infrastructure program to
perk up an economy that was reeling under the effect of a global recession. Unfortunately, the
revenue performance was faltering; as a result, huge budget deficits ensued. There are three
ways of financing the deficit: (a) increased tax collection; (b) foreign or domestic borrowings;
and (c) money creation. If the government borrows from the commercial banks, it uses a portion
of household savings, leaving less loanable funds for private enterprises---the so-called
"crowding out" effect. But "crowding out" of private investment takes place only if such
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borrowing leads to an increase in real interest rate. Furthermore, when government expenditures
raises income level, then there ought not to be a one-to-one decline in investment.
The Central Bank may choose to accommodate the fiscal expansion by printing and/or
increasing the supply of money and through open-market purchase of bonds with which the
government pays for its deficit.
In recent Philippine history, because of the huge Central Bank deficit, and the tight
monetary ceiling imposed in programs agreed upon with the International Monetary Fund,
financing deficit through money expansion has not been resorted to.
Fiscal deficits from 1990 to 1991 have been targeted for reduction through lower public
expenditures and higher revenue; the latter through new tax measures and speedier privatization
of state firms and acquired assets. This fiscal strategy was to be implemented under a program
of tight money and nominal public sector deficit ceilings. Unfortunately, as shown in a recent
study (Diokno 1992), shortfalls in revenues due to nonpassage of the proposed tax measures, or
lower taxes due to economic slowdown, or delays in the sale of public firms and assets, were
matched by reductions in public spending. Worse, public spending cuts were also resorted to
whenever there was a cost overrun due to higher interest rates or greater debt service due to
higher than anticipated debt payments.
Partly because of the budget squeeze in 1990 and 1991, the economy stagnated. The nine
percent import levy which was imposed to make up for the nonpassage of some tax measures
also contributed significantly to the economic slowdown. Thus, the adjustment measures which
were designed to stabilize the economy may have dampened the inflation rate, but they also
resulted in lower OUtputand higher unemployment. Unfortunately, the budgetary CUtSwhich hit
infrastructure spending severely have shifted the economy to a lower growth path. The future
flow of investments may be slower than usual in the absence of the necessary transport, energy
and telecommunications facilities required by foreign and domestic investors.
B. Monetary Policy
The transmission mechanism of monetary policy, i.e., the link between the financial
sector and real sector of the economy can be traced through a careful analysis of the balance
sheet of the Central Bank. Within a closed economy IS-LM framework, the effect on income
of a change in the stock of money depends on the relative interest sensitivity of the demand for
money and the demand for goods.
There are two steps in the transmission mechanism. The first is that an increase in real
balances, (M/P), creates a portfolio disequilibrium which causes portfolio holders to weigh the
cost of holding zero-earning money as against interest-bearing assets, thus changing asset prices
and yields. In short, the change in money supply changes interest rates. The second step of the
transmission process occurs when the change in interest rates affect aggregate demand.
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The Central Bank has the power to change the size of the deposit liabilities of commercial
banks (KBs) and therefore the money supply, loan supply and interest rate by changing its own
liabilities and using any of its policy instruments or other transactions that have direct bearing
on its balance sheet.
Central Bank control of the 1honey supply relies on a fundamental relationship between
the liabilities of the Central Bank, the monetary base (H), and the liabilities of the commercial
banks (KBs), referred to as private money.
The basic link between Central Bank's monopoly over the production of H and KBs'
private money is established by the government through the minimum reserve requirement. The
most common method of changing the size of the balance sheet is through open-market
operations. If the Central Bank buys securities, the monetary base increases, and such operation
is deemed expansionary; if it sells securities, the monetary base declines, and such operation is
considered contractionary.
But buying securities is also considered expansionary in another sense. Since it creates
excess demand in the bond markets, interest rates which move in the opposite direction to bond
prices, will fall and stimulate investment (Pranchowny 1985: 162).
In the Philippines, the Central Bank has at its disposal the following monetary policy
tools: (a) changes in the reserve requirement; (b) interest rate policy with respect to the
maximum deposit rates and lending rates of banks; (c) supervision and directions from the
Central Bank; and (d) selective credit control such as credit priorities, allocation and eligibility
rules (maturities of loans and required securities against bank loans), variation of the margin
requirement for opening letter of credit, maximum capital ratio and risk asset/capital ratio.
Changes in monetary policy affect real variables such as output, prices, employment and
real wages. This can be illustrated by citing the recent experience of the Philippines. During the
Marcos regime, ,loans both at market and concessional rates were geared to a favored group of
people close to the regime. This process resulted in poor investment and led to the financial
crisis in the 1980s. At about the same time, the second oil price shock took place further
aggravating the fragile state of the Philippine economy. As a countercyclical measure, the
government embarked on a massive infrastructure program. But with weakening revenue
performance, the budget deficit ballooned from 2 to 5.5 percent of GNP.
The crisis was further aggravated by Central Bank's direct intervention in the financial
market. It administratively fixed the interest rates way below market rate, imposed the gross
receipts tax which restricted competition in the banking system. Its policy of restricted bank
entry and exit has sheltered both the big and small banks from competition, allowing the former
to earn abnormally high excess profits and the latter to operate at high costs (Tan 1989). The
Central Bank made generous rediscounting facilities at extremely low discount rates making the
commercial banks more dependent on the discount window as a regular source of loanable funds.
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Government budget deficits were financed through money creation. This, together with
the huge balance of payments (BOP) deficit and the assassination of former Senator Benigno
Aquino, created negative expectations on the economy's immediate and medium-term recovery
and growth. This prompted capital flight, increased the general price level due to panic buying
and higher production costs, and slowed down investment spending due to heightened uncertainty
and lower prospects for growth. From 1983 to 1985, total output contracted by 15 percent,
investment declined by 50 percent, and bank supply of credit to the private sector fell by 49
percent.
The Philippine experience in the early 1980s showed how changes in monetary policy in
response to fiscal and BOP imbalances affect real variables such as output, prices, employment
and real wages. There are three ways by which we can show how monetary policy affects
consumer spending. The first is through the stock of wealth held by the community. It may
include real assets and financial assets. Capital gains arising from changes in stock and share
prices affect the level of wealth and therefore, consumption. The second route is through the
so-called "cost-of-credit" effect. Changes in interest rates affect consumer behavior with effects
ranging from intertemporal substitution effects (between savings or consumption between period
t and t+ 1) and wealth effect. The cost of borrowing, interest rate, determines the financing of
consumption. The third route is through credit rationing by financial institutions and a regime
of controlled interest rates.
Unfortunately, the impact of the change in interest rate on savings and consumption is
not clear-cut. Changes in the term structure create an ambiguous result since substitution effect
and income effect imply different behaviors on savings.
On the part of the business sector, a straightforward way of showing the direction of
transmission mechanism is through the effects of interest rates on credit availability and/or
quantity of bank loans. As firms find more loans available in the credit market, their needed
operational expansion spurs investment and the hiring of more factor inputs, more production,
increased bank deposits and higher income. As economic activity expands, higher real cash
balances are required to meet an increasing demand for goods and services.
The determinants of the Central Bank's policy instruments in implementing its monetary
objectives depend on the following factors: (a) the state of development and structure of the
financial system (i.e., whether there is a strong government securities market) and the strength
and size of individual banks comprising the systems; (b) the nature and magnitude of the policy
action; and (c) the promptness of the response of and degree of impact on the monetary
aggregate. (San Jose 1990: 145).
The extent and degree of their effects on the real sector of the economy are not fully
predictable in their timing or in the extent to which they affect demand and supply (Dornbusch
and Fischer 1990). For instance, if a certain policy instrument produces fluctuation in the goods
market which widens the gap between actual and expected value, a continuous accommodation
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of such policy will, in the long run, get out of control and produce an environment of substantial
inefficiency and uncertainty.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
A. Theoretical Framework
An ideal framework for analyzing the impact of macro adjustment policies on economic
agents---whether consumers or producers---is one which allows a counterfactual analysis of a
state of affairs in which the economic agent is affected by prices, incomes and levels of public
services in a complicated general equilibrium framework. St,ch framework was suggested by
Behrman and Deolalikar (1991). Yet, in evaluating the effects of adjustment on the poor and the
social sector in Jamaica, Behrman and Deolalikar used time series data to analyze whether
macroeconomic adjustment was associated with significant deterioration in various indicators of
health, nutritional and welfare outcomes, particularly among the poor.
The effects on economic agents, such as a consumer, of macro policy in an adjustment
program depends on (i) effect of macro policies on the incomes of and prices facing the
consumer, and (ii) the effect of income and price changes on tile behavior of the consumer.
The relationship between the incomes and prices faced by the poor and adjustment
policies such as currency devaluation, contractionary monetary and fiscal policies, wage and
price controls, and foreign trade liberalization has been the subject of a number of studies
(Addison and Demery 1985; Behrman 1988; Scobie 1989; Glewwe and de Tray 1988).
According to Behrman and Deolalikar (1991), "although economic theory provides a framework
for analyzing these links, the number of such links and their complex interactions make it
virtually impossible to predict a priori the impact of adjustment policy instruments on the
resources controlled by the poor." On the second relationship, the consensus of the recent
research is that "because of the possibility of the substitution of households---among diverse
sources of nutrient intakes, across the food intakes and labor supplies of different household
members, and among various health and schooling inputs---it is difficult to predict the magnitude
(and in some cases the direction) of changing incomes and prices on household human capital
outcomes without careful empirical studies."
As shown by the results of the previous studies, the theoretical linkage is not as simple
as it seems. First, to be meaningful, the analysis has to be done in a general equilibrium
framework for which sometimes the results are intractable. For example, in a simple two-sector
economy---say agriculture (A) and manufacturing (M)---it is quite easy to show that a tax on
labor income in the manufacturing sector will have an adverse impact on labor in both sectors
under some assumptions, inclt, ding labor mobility. The analysis becomes more complicated as
the number of sectors and factors of production increases.
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In any event, there are at least three strands of ideas in the economic literature from
which a formal analysis on the micro effects of macro policy can be derived: (a) private-
ownership economy with public goods and a government; (b) general equilibrium incidence
analysis and the subsequent computable general equilibrium (CGE) models; and (c) net incidence
analysis.
On the optimal study of public goods, one may consider an Arrow-Debreu private-
ownership economy with public goods and a government, as postulated by Groves and Ledyard
in O,otimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the 'Free Rider Problem', 1975. The
economy has L private goods and K public goods. The model has two types of ordinary
economic agents---consumers and producers---plus a special agent, the government. The model
allows for I consumers and J producers. Private and public goods are differentiated by specifying
that the entire net production of public goods is consumed by each consttmer while the net
production of private goods must be divided among consumers. A government, G, is completely
specified by a language M, an allocation rule y (.) and consumer tax rules, < CI(.)>. This
highly theoretical construct may allow the determination of the appropriate level and allocation
of public spending consistent with taxpayer's willingness to pay but is unable to handle other
macro policies as, for example, trade liberalization or relaxation of banking rules.
The second strand of literature, also theoretical but subject to computational verification
using existing CGE models, appropriately specified, is the Harberger-McClure-Mieszkowski
(HMM) model for evaluating tax incidence using a general equilibrium framework. For example,
the impact of a mandated general wage increase in the organized sector can be analyzed using
the HMM model. In a specific Philippine case, Clarete and Whalley (1991), using an applied
static general equilibrium model of the Philippine economy, evaluated the welfare cost and
burden of various taxes, namely: excises, tariffs, VAT, corporate and personal income taxes.
The third strand of economic literature is the net incidence analysis as popularized by
Gillespie, "Effect of Public Expenditure on the Distribution of income" in Essays in Fiscal
Federalism edited by R.A. Musgrave, 1985. The methodology involves looking into the
individual's income position after adjusting for the benefits received from government spending
and benefits or costs resulting from certain tax impositions versus his income position without
the spending and tax measures. It has two major drawbacks. First, the data requirements for
such an analysis are unavailable, although proxy data can be gathered given sufficient time and
resources. Second, its application will be restricted to direct incidence through government
spending and taxes. For example, it is not designed to handle the impact of trade liberalization
or dismantling of monopolies in the coconut, sugar, or fertilizer industries.
All things considered, the use of a general equilibrium framework appears to be the most
promising. At the next phase of the study, it would be useful to analyze the impact of macro
adjustment on factor owners. Specifically, it should be able to answer the question: who bears
the burden of adjustment?
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Some possible applications of the proposed CGE modelling on the sectoral concerns could
be cited here. First, consider the impact of government regulations on the power generation and
distribution sector. One may look at a baseline where the National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR) assumes a major role in the regulation of power supply and setting of power and
tariff rates. NAPOCOR affects households indirectly through MERALCO or other electric firms,
with the tariff affecting the behavior of households. It also affects the goods market through the
tariff and power supply reliability. A counterfactual case can be modelled with a deregulated
power sector. Comparing the two cases, one can then discuss the impact of deregulation on
income and relative prices, and which sectors or factor owners will be favored or penalized.
Second, the impact of macro adjustment policies on the informal sector. One can
construct a model of an economy where the manufacturing sector is disaggregated into small,
medium and large. The impact of Kalakalan 20 (which exempts small firms from taxation) on
factor owners can then be shown by assuming a tax on income of medium and large firms only.
This can be evaluated based on certain assumptions on labor and capital mobility.
Third, consider the possible application of the proposed CGE model on gender issues.
The modeler may look at the impact of macro adjustment policies on female-intensive industries
(e.g., garments and electronics) vis-a-vis male-intensive industries (e.g., construction and
mining). Appropriately specified, the model, for example, can look into the effect "of the
imposition of the 9-percent import levy import on employment and output; it can also look into
its impact on female and male workers.
B. The Political Economy 03"RefotTns
The process of formulating and implementing economic reforms should be a worthwhile
subject of formal inquiry. According to Behrman and Deolalikar, "at a certain level, the question
of how macroeconomic adjustment affects the poor is the wrong question to ask, because
adjustment policies are not homogeneous, and it is possible, within limits, for a government to
choose policies which differ in their adverse effects on the poor." The same thing can be said
of households and firms.
Within the Philippine context, it is probably incorrect to assume that in designing the
Memorandum of Economic Policy (MEP), the country's negotiators have always been guided
by the desire to improve the welfare of specific households or income classes. In the first place,
the information necessary for such an approach is difficult, if not extremely expensive, to
generate. For example, on the expenditure side, the focus of discussion has always been on the
size of the deficit rather than the specific allocation of government expenditures, say for
education or health; of course, the World Bank will call the attention of the government
negotiators on its inability to meet its infrastructure spending targets. On the tax side, the
Department of Finance (DOF) has been more concerned with meeting its revenue target than
with the redistributive impact of taxes.
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One of the questions that the MIMAP project would like to ask is: What outcomes at the
micro level would have to occur if the existing macro adjustment policies are to succeed in
easing rather than worsening the initial imbalances? Looking at the government as a special
economic agent, the answer could be" improved policy formulation and strengthening of the tax
machinery and economic research institutions.
It could be argued that the imposition of an additional 9-percent import levy could have
been avoidedif there were closer coordination between the Executive Department and Congress.
Presumably, had such a close lhak existed, alternative revenue measures could have been
approved. On the other hand, if the Department of Finance had known of the general
equilibrium effects of the measure, it would not have imposed the levy in the first place.
In reality, the choice of adjustment measures is dictated by what is politically and
administratively feasible. Hence, the restructuring of the Central Bank has not been pushed by
the Executive Department presumably because it is not politically feasible. But those responsible
for approving such a proposal must be convinced on the basis of its merit. Congress has to be
convinced not only that the objective is desirable but that the measure proposed is the best way
to achieve the objective. This requires good working relationships between the Executive
Department and Congress. At the same time, it requires good technical advice. Thus, by way
of improving economic policy formulation, the link between the two branches of government has
to be strengthened. The technical expertise of the standing committees of Congress should also
be upgraded. Given the frequency of elections, and the change of leadership in Congress, a
permanent staff of technical people should be institutionalized in both houses of Congress.
The ,administrative machinery has to be improved too. The nature and speed of reforms
are oftentimes dictated by the quality and commitment of people in the bureaucracy. For
example, in most developing countries, tax reformers have put emphasis on simplification (an
extreme case is the fiat income tax) rather than equity because the tax machinery is perceived
to be weak or unable to handle more equitable but administratively complex tax structures.
Research institutions should link with interest groups so that they may jointly influence
the adoption of meaningful reforms in the economy. Without a doubt, the close link between the
Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS) and the Philippine Chamber of Commerce
and Industry (PCCI) has improved dramatically the quality of discussion on important economic
issues, which in turn has brought about meaningful economic reforms during the last few
months.
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